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PEOPLE V. CHAMBERS'
(decided March 19, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In an unanimous per curiam decision, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a prospective juror could not be removed for
cause for initial statements exhibiting a propensity to believe police
testimony made during voir dire when subsequent statements of that
prospective juror unequivocally demonstrated that the prospective
juror could be fair and impartial.
2
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant, Quintin Chambers, was indicted and tried in
Monroe County Court for second-degree murder.3 During jury se-
lection, both the trial court and defense counsel asked prospective
jurors collectively whether they would be affording "'greater weight
to the testimony of a police officer as opposed to any other witness
who testifies."' 4 None of the potential jurors responded to the
questions in the affirmative.
5
During voir dire, a prospective juror admitted that in his opin-
ion, "'trained police officers are good observers"' and that he
didn't "'think it would necessarily behoove them to exaggerate a
whole lot about things. They're doing their job."' 6 The following
colloquy between defense counsel and the prospective juror
occurred:
Counsel: Okay. Well, do you think that- then it's your belief
that a police officer wouldn't get on the stand and
lie about anything; is that right?
1. 7 N.Y.2d 417 (2002).
2. Id. at 419.
3. Id. at 418.
4. People v. Chambers, 727 N.Y.S.2d 210, 211 (App. Div. 2001).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 211-12.
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Juror: I don't know. I don't know how to answer that
particular question. I guess just thinking that, I
would tend to believe police testimony to some
degree.
Counsel: Well, to some degree more than other testimony?
Juror: Well, I'd like to think I'm fair, but that's just
popped into my head when you were talking about
that.
Counsel: That's what I'm looking for because, I mean, you'll
hear police officers. I don't know if they're going to
be telling the truth or not.
Juror: Sure.
Counsel: I just want to be sure a juror isn't going to give
their testimony any more weight than anyone else.
Are you telling me you would do that?
Juror: I would try not to let it affect that. I don't think it
would be a problem.
Counsel: Well, I think if it is on your mind, it may be a
problem. Do you think that it could affect you, your
ability to be fair and listen fairly to police testimony
[emphasis added].
Juror: No, I don't think so. [Emphasis added]
7
Contending that the prospective juror indicated a bias toward
police testimony thereby precluding his service as an impartial
juror, defense counsel moved to excuse the prospective juror for
cause.8 The trial court denied defendant's challenge.9 Defense
counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove the potential juror,
subsequently exhausting all his peremptory challenges. 10 A jury
convicted defendant of murder in the second degree. 1 Defendant
appealed to the appellate division.
A divided Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in a 3-2 vote,
affirmed the conviction. The majority held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's challenge for
cause. 12 According to the appellate division, the potential juror's
7. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d at 212.
8. Id. at 418.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 418-19.
11. Id. at 418.
12. Chambers, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
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statements that he would "'tend to believe police testimony to some
degree"' did not demonstrate "'knowledge or opinions reflecting a
state of mind likely to preclude impartial service.'- 13 The court did
not find the juror to have revealed actual bias or a "'state of mind
that would prevent [him] from rendering an impartial verdict
based on the evidence at trial.' ' 14 Furthermore, the prospective
juror's addition of "I don't think so" to his unequivocal "no,"
"simply mirror[ed] defense counsel's question" as to whether the
potential juror "thought" his ability to remain impartial would be
affected.
1 5
Noting that most jurors have predispositions when they enter
the jury box, the appellate division stated that a potential juror
should be excused only when it is established that exists a
substantial risk that the potential juror's predisposition will affect
his or her obligation to be impartial. 16 Given the trial court's
peculiar opportunity to evaluate the juror's statement, the appellate
division deferred to the trial court's determination to deny
defendant's challenge for cause.
17
Justice Green and Justice Pine dissented, asserting that the
prospective juror's statements did not constitute an "unequivocal
declaration of impartiality."18 This bias demonstrated that it was
likely that the juror's state of mind would preclude him from being
impartial. The dissenters contended that the juror "expressed his
bias in favor of the testimony of police officers" and should have
been removed for cause. 19 Since defendant exercised all his
peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection,
the dissenters maintained that the appellate division should have
ordered a new trial.
20
13. Chambers, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 211. (quoting People v.Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 614
(2000)).
14. Id. at 212 (quoting People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001); People v.
Wiegert, 670 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1998)).
15. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 614 (2000)).
16. Id. (quoting People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 885 (1984)).
17. Id. (quoting People Chatman, 722 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 2001); citing
People v. Hagenbuch, 701 N.Y.S.2d 213 (App. Div. 1999)).
18. Id. at 213.
19. Chambers, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
20. Id. at 213 (citing CPLR 270.20[2]; People v. White, 714 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App.
Div. 2000)).
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Defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The
issue confronting the court of appeals was whether a prospective
juror who qualifies a response to a question regarding his ability to
be impartial with "I think" gives an equivocal response insufficient
to alleviate doubts regarding his impartiality, requiring the trial
court to excuse the prospective juror for cause.
21
III. DISCUSSION
The New York Court of Appeals began its decision by reiterat-
ing the proposition that "a prospective juror whose statements raise
a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be ex-
cused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or
she can be fair and impartial."
22
The court agreed with the majority of the appellate division.
According to the court, in this case, even if the potential juror's
statements created serious doubts as to his capability to be impar-
tial, he ultimately and unequivocally declared that he could be fair
and impartial.
23
The court then rejected defendant's argument that the word
"think" served as a talismanic word that transformed the potential
juror's response "no" into an equivocal response to questions re-
garding his ability to be impartial.24 Relying on People v. Blyden,
25
the court concluded that adding the words "I think so" did not au-
tomatically alter the prospective juror's unequivocal "no" into an
equivocal response.
26
In Blyden, the court of appeals held that in an assault prosecu-
tion of a black defendant, the trial court abused its discretion by
denying defendant's challenge to excuse a prospective juror who
voiced hostility to racial minorities for cause. 27 The court in Blyden
stated that in determining whether the prospective juror's state-
ment is unequivocal, the juror's testimony should be taken as a
whole, in context.2 According to the Blyden court, the prospective
21. People v. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d 417, 418 (2002).
22. Id. at 419.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 55 N.Y.2d 73 (1982).
26. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d at 419.
27. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 74 (1982).
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juror's responses that he thought he could put aside his personal
feelings and remain impartial, after expressing hostility toward ra-
cial minorities, "fell short" of the required express and unequivocal
declarations.
28
The court stated that mere words do not contain a talismanic
power to transform bias into impartiality.29 Words must be taken in
context. If any doubt remains subsequent to statements concerning
the ability to be impartial when considered in light of the all the
potential juror's responses, the potential juror should be excused
for cause. 30 "The costs to society and the criminal justice system of
discharging the juror are comparatively slight, while the costs in
fairness to the defendant and the general perception of fairness of
not discharging such a juror are great." 31 Applying the principles
of Blyden, the Chambers court stated that taken as a whole and con-
sidering the entire the context of the prospective juror's testimony,
the juror's statements, regarding his ability to render a fair verdict,
were unequivocal.3 2
The court's final observation served as a reminder to trial
courts concerning their responsibility during voir dire. Citing sev-
eral cases, the court of appeals noted that it has repeatedly been
asked to evaluate a particular statement made by a prospective juror
against "the clear legal standard requiring an unequivocal assertion
of impartiality."
33
In People v. Bludson, the court of appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying defendant's challenges for
cause as to two potential jurors.3 4 The trial court had collectively
instructed prospective jurors as to the presumption of defendant's
innocence, the People's burden of proof, and defendant's right not
to testify. 3 5 During voir dire, one potential juror stated that in order
to acquit the defendant, she would need defense counsel to prove
28. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d at 79.
29. Id. at 78.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d at 419.
33. Id. at 419.(citing People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001); People v. Arnold,
96 N.Y.2d 358 (2001); People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000)).
34. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644, 645 (2001).
35. Id.
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defendant's innocence.3 6 Another juror stated that defendant's
failure to testify "might influence his decision" and "'might make it
hard"' for him to acquit the defendant.3 7 The court of appeals
found that these statements cast serious doubt on their ability to
render a fair verdict.38 The court held that the trial court's failure
to elicit unequivocal assurance from the potential juror that he
would be able to render a fair verdict warranted removal for
cause.39 The court also stated that the jury panel's prior collective
instructions were insufficient to constitute an unequivocal
declaration.
40
In Arnold, the New York Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred by not obtaining unequivocal assurance that a prospec-
tive juror could be fair and warranted removal for cause. 41 Arnold
involved a prosecution of a defendant for assault of his former girl-
friend.42 A potential juror stated during voir dire that she had done
a lot of research on domestic violence and battered women's syn-
drome and that she had a "problem" and did not think that she
should be sitting on the case because of her experience. 43 The
Court of Appeals found that the collective acknowledgment by the
entire jury panel that they would follow the judge's instructions did
not constitute an unequivocal declaration of impartiality of a pro-
spective juror.
44
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Johnson and its
companion case, People v. Reyes, held that the trial court should have
either excused a potential juror or obtained an unequivocal re-
sponse from the juror.45 The trial court's failure to do so warranted
a new trial.46 In Johnson, a potential juror stated that he had dealt
with police through his job at Bellevue Hospital and that he would
36. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d at 646.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 646.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 368 (2001).
42. Id. at 360.
43. Id. at 360-1.
44. Id. at 363.
45. People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 603, 614-15 (2000).
46. Id. at 603.
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give policy officers the benefit of the doubt.47 The companion
case, People v. Reyes, involved a prosecution for the sale of heroin, a
potential juror stated that as a parent she was particularly upset by
drug abuse and could "only try" to be fair and impartial.48 Further-
more, the potential juror stated that although defendant's criminal
records didn't automatically make him guilty, it "might be difficult"
for her to be open-minded.
49
In Chambers, the court observed that for over a century, the use
of the word "think" by a prosecution juror has been challenged as
equivocal. 50 The court of appeals reminded trial courts to conduct
additional questioning when a prospective juror qualifies an une-
quivocal "yes" or "no" response to a question regarding impartiality
with words like "I think" or "I'll try.'"M1 An additional question or
two could easily eliminate any doubt as to equivocation, ensure a




In an unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that a prospective juror who qualifies a response to a ques-
tions regarding his ability to be impartial with "I think" does not
give an equivocal response and therefore does not require the trial
court to excuse the prospective juror.53 The Court of Appeals re-
minded trial courts when doubts arise regarding the equivocation




47. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d at 605.
48. Id. at 606-7.
49. Id. at 609.
50. People v. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d 417, 419 (2002).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 418.
54. Id. at 419.
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